Sunday, September 23, 2007

charles williams explains it all

At a recent book fair I stumbled across Charles Williams' Descent of the Dove: A Short History of the Holy Spirit in the Church in paperback for fifty cents. I call that a bargain. The first Charles Williams I read was something like three years ago, when I read All Hallows' Eve in preparation for the All Saints'/Halloween celebrations. I had only begun to learn about the Inklings (through my love of Tolkien) and had only heard vague things about Williams. Once I learned of his (non-fiction) theological writings, I was immediately attracted to the title for Descent of the Dove.

Descent
is a popular history of the Church, elegant in its language, sometimes loose with its facts because quite unscientifically rhetorical in its argumentation. Nevertheless, the specialist can find a great deal of nuance on certain topics, all the more so because Williams prefers to frame Church history as a history of the Holy Spirit. I couldn't help myself from admiring the deep confluence of institution and Spirit that Williams' narrative illustrates. Williams has a knack for reintroducing familiar themes in fresh but traditional language (e.g., his persistence in calling Christ "Messias"). As such, his prose is inviting to the Christian of deep tradition or the novice who thinks s/he is quite familiar with the deep tradition, while also breathing new life into the all-too-familiar history.

The first paragraph is indicative of the shape of the whole, and I relished it from the first reading:

"The beginning of Christendom is, strictly, at a point out of time. A metaphysical trigonometry finds it among the spiritual Secrets, at the meeting of two heavenward lines, one drawn from Bethany along the Ascent of Messias, the other from Jerusalem against the Descent of the Paraclete. That measurement, the measurement of eternity in operation, of the bright cloud and the rushing wind, is, in effect, theology. (1)"

Like I said, elegant. I'm not sure I've found a better succinct definition of Christian theology. Filled with theological learning, but without either the dryness or precision of the academy, Descent does not fail to incite thought.

How could I resist discussing, however briefly, Williams' explanation of the conflict between Pelagius and Augustine? I dare to quote at length:

"That man, in the person of Adam, had fallen was common ground. Pelagius said, in effect, that (i) Adam had been created in a state of natural good, (ii) that he had somehow sinned, and set a bad example of sinning, so that a sort of social habit of sin had developed, into which men were introduced as they grew up before they were reasonable, (iii) but that any man at any moment could get out of this distressing social habit by simply being firm with himself--'have courage, my boy, to say no,' (iv) and that therefore no particular grace of God was needed to initiate the change, though that grace was a convenient and necessary help: which was always to be found by the right-willing man.

"Against this the Augustinian view--with the great help of Augustine himself--asserted (i) that man was created in a state of supernatural good, of specific awareness of God, (ii) that Adam had got himself out of that state by sin, and his sin was 'pride'--that is, 'the act of deserting the soul's true "principle" and constituting oneself one's own principle. [Nigel Abercrombie, St. Augustine and French Classical Thought]' He had, as it were claimed to have, and behaved as if he had, a necessity of being in himself. He had, somehow and somewhere, behaved as if he were God. (iii) His descendants therefore were not at all in a mere social habit of sinning; they did not merely sometimes sin; they were sinners, which was not at all the same thing. Nay, more, they had, all of them, been involved in that first original iniquity, and in its guilt. ...Thus, being all guilty, we all deserved, and were on our way to, hell by the mere business of getting ourselves born, though not, of course, for getting ourselves born. This was precisely the agony: to be born was good, but that good meant the utmost evil, life-into-death and death-into-life. ...[M]en were corrupt; they existed int eh night of dreadful ignorance and the storm of perverse love; they were for ever and ever sharers in that primal catastrophe which was the result of Adam imagining that he had a principle and necessity of existence within himself. (iv) It was therefore blasphemous and heretical nonsense to talk of man as being mildly and socially habituated to sin: he was in sin, and he could not get out by his own choice. he could not move but by grace, by that principle which was not in him. To Augustine Pelagius was practically teaching men to follow, to plunge deeper into, that old original catastrophe; he was almost declaring that man was his own principle, that he did his own good deeds. But all Christendom, and especially Augustine, knew that only Christ could act Christ. (67-8)"

"Exchange, substitution, co-inherence are a natural fact as well as a supernatural truth. 'Another is in me,' said Felicitas; 'we were in another,' said Augustine. The co-inhereence reaches back to the beginning as it stretches on to the end, and the anthropos is present everywhere. 'As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive'; co-inherence did not begin with Christianity; all that happened then was that co-inherence itself was redeemed and revealed by that very redemption as a supernatural principle as well as a natural. (69-70)"

Upon reading this, I had to stop four pages before the end of the chapter and ponder and savor and learn. This is precisely the argument I had been suggesting against a creational ontology which ignores the Fall and sin to its own detriment. Only Christ could act Christ. But if there is a necessity of existence (whether by creation or by autonomy) within the person, Christ need not act Christ. Depravity, while not so deep as to defile the imago, goes deep enough to re-orient the necessary principles of existence.

This is the part of Augustine I think the Reformed tradition misses. The part of Augustine they get right, I fear, is that which Williams presently describes:

"But if only Christ acts Christ, who acts Anti-Christ? If all our good doing is God's doing, whose is our evil doing? Ours? Yes. God, as it were, determines and predestinates himself to do good in certain lives; this is his grace. And what of the lives in which he does not determine and predestinate himself to do good? Well--he does not. Those lives then are lost? Well--yes. God saves whom he chooses and the rest damn themselves. 'His equity is so secret that it is beyond the reach of all human understanding.' It is of the highest importance to realize that, in that sentence, Augustine from the bottom of his heart mean 'equity' and meant 'beyond all human understanding.' (68-9)"

That is, I wonder if this is the mutation of Augustine to which I was reacting. It is precisely the predestination without the Fall. If we are to accept this view of election (a rather large if), we dare not do so without the Fall, for the Fall is the only thing that makes election merciful. Perhaps it is we who act Anti-Christ, or perhaps there is a principle of anti-Christ which acts anti-Christ in us. That is, election is a terrible prospect if not in some way determined by the prior (unworthy) action of persons involving the co-inherence with Adam. And this co-inherence is more than being "mildly and socially habituated" to sin. It has to do with the very necessity and principle of existence--that is, ontology.

The incomprehensibility of election/predestination is this: "The Equity of Redemption is immediately at work; it predestinates whom it chooses, and it does not predestinate whom it does not choose. But its choice is (beyond human thought) inextricably mingled with each man's own choice. It wills what he wills, because it has freedom to do so. Predestination is the other side of its own freedom. Words fall away from the inscrutable union, which can be the inscrutable separation. (71)" And so does human choice cooperate (we might say) with the predestination such that "only Christ could act Christ" and therefore, "'Perfection consists not in what we give to God but in what we receive from him.' [P. Rousselot, S.J. and J. Herby, S.J., Christianity and the Soul of Antiquity] (72)" But this reception is not primarily that of Creation, but that of Redemption; not in the main the grace of the created order, but the grace of the order of salvation.

His penchant for the journalistically dramatic aside, Williams offers in his Descent a wonderfully woven interpretation of the history of the Church. More importantly, I've found a new friend.

8 comments:

Larry said...

Andy,

I too heard apocolyptical voices in your quotes from Charles Williams' Descent of the Dove: A Short History of the Holy Spirit in the Church. I heard them accompanied with American Transcendentalism (perhaps its rhetorical style) too...is that right?
You mentioned that you see some appropriate criticism of creational ontology in his critique of election and Augustine. I wonder if Augustine is being read very charitably here. It seems like Augustine's rhetoric concerning the importance of election within an already broken world is being read against his defense of a prelapsarian world? Creational ontology would agree with Augustine's description of the mistaken principle of pride and would read with Augustine the radical nature of the Fall as a turn away from the original blessing and thus "to plunge deeper into, that old original catastrophe" and agrees that "that only Christ could act Christ. (67-8)" After the Fall Christ's acts are for Creation and for the Eschaton without, in any way, debunking Christ's ultimate accomplishment in re-turning Creation and the Eschaton back(and forward?) to its principle aim(s). So when Williams attacks Augustine's view of election it seems as though he does so only rebuke a phatom of his prose, not really Augustine; especially with the introduction of the "transcendentalist?" use of co-inhereence. He writes, "co-inherence did not begin with Christianity; all that happened then was that co-inherence itself was redeemed and revealed by that very redemption as a supernatural principle as well as a natural. (69-70)" Williams' use of co-inherence introduces a bifurcation that into the context that seems forced. To say that "all that happened then was that the co-inherence itself was redeemed" is to miss Augustine's point. The original principle of humanity that is lost in the Fall is deprived in the Fall and results in a radical social evil that is unwilled by humanity but also foreign to its original blessing. Williams, by taking co-inherence as strictly "natural" and thus Fallen, misses the importance of redemption. Redemption does not make "a supernatural principle as well as a natural," rather, it reveals the original direction of co-inherence to be eschatologically directed and thus originally open to the indwelling of God that is shut down by the prideful desires of humanity. In this way, Williams can only assert a radical "gap" or breach within Creation by assuming that Creation was never intended to be God's dwelling place; as if God did not make the heavens and the earth in creation. But you move with Williams here and go on to attack a creational ontology by positiong, "Only Christ could act Christ. But if there is a necessity of existence (whether by creation or by autonomy) within the person, Christ need not act Christ. Depravity, while not so deep as to defile the imago, goes deep enough to re-orient the necessary principles of existence." First, how could an original and necessary principle of existence "re-orient" (I think you mean structurally re-adjusted since a creational ontology would argue for an apostate orientation in the Fall) and remain original. This "re-orientation" would suggest an original supplement to creation that supplants its (original) necessity. Second, but to your first point, why does a creational necessity of/for existence necessitate an antagonism against Christ's act? Could it not compliment Christ's act, if not in adding to it then in being affirmed in it? How does the original blessing of God that continues to gift and call creation to (more) life usurp any legitimacy from Christ's act? It would only do so if Christ's act must be interpreted as authoritarian. This leads to the comments on "acts the anti-Christ?" I actually think you cannot understand the work of the anti-Christ without a sound creational ontology. If you are insisting that creation implies election you might be right but I think that creation is God's first act of election. Election, when it is meaning is determined by redemption, changes focus. So I don't think that God's election necessitates the Fall but that the Fall demands that election's meaning re-adjusts. I don't think that this is the final meaning of election since there is plenty of evidence that election opens up to promise as its eschatological aim in the original blessing of Creation. You insist that "this reception is not primarily that of Creation, but that of Redemption; not in the main the grace of the created order, but the grace of the order of salvation." I only suggest that salvation works in two directions; creationally and eschatologically. Why insist that salvation be simply redemption--are we not saved for more...

Andy said...

Larry,

Apocalyptic, yes. American Transcendentalist...maybe, but if it is, it's pretty filtered.

Anyway, as always, thanks for the close reading and stimulating questions.

I should begin by pointing out that my use of Williams should not really reflect on Williams' work itself. For instance, I play Williams' reading of Augustine against itself where he merely attempts to summarize Augustine. Williams never attacks Augustine on election. I have troubles with it, though. (At least as presented by Williams.) This is one of those places where Williams is at his finest description, but therein loses a bit of precision. On the other hand, you will notice his cryptic disclaimer, "Against this the Augustinian view--with the great help of Augustine himself--asserted...." Williams is aware that his familiarity is largely with an Augustinian view, not necessarily the direct thought of Augustine himself. I merely capitalize on the simple (simplistic?) views Williams presents. (Which I think is licit, given that the views he expresses are probably conditioned by contemporary theological discussion, if not between gifted theologians, then at least by their disciples.) At any rate, my use of Williams is my own; he is cleared of all charges. As far as I know, Williams does not owe his idea of coinherence to American Transcendentalism. But I have not done the biographical work to really know where he gets the idea.

Onward. So, the position I am arguing, basically, asks for more regarding the Fall than a "radical social evil that is unwilled by humanity but also foreign to its original blessing." (I'm not sure Williams has in mind that coinherence is natural, therefore post-lapsarian. My guess is by "natural," he meant, "created.") "Radical social evil" still sounds to me like a persistent social habit rather than an actual evil, we might say, principle. Likewise, being "foreign to its original blessing," does not seem to cut deep enough into the sinews of original creation. When I say sin does not go so deep as to defile the imago, but deep enough to re-orient the necessary principles of existence, we should keep in mind that the creation was not created in the image and likeness, humanity was. That is, the only thing untouched by the Fall, is the image and likeness; the rest falls under the curse. (I must again stress that this is my position; whether Williams would even deign to listen to it is uncertain.) To answer your question regarding "re-orient" versus structurally readjust, I stand by what I said. I never said the Fall left everything original. In fact, it is part of my position that the necessary principles of existence (ontology) undergo events, i.e. they CHANGE. The only way I can see to have a static ontology (such as Platonic ontology) is to have an ontology that is not static. That is, a static Platonic ontology has to be historicized in order to be true. This is the great mutation of Plato that transpires in the Fathers (for that matter in the book of Hebrews). Otherwise, we end up with Gnosticism. I've dug a deep ditch just now. This needs to be nuanced, but I cannot do it now.
But the follow-up is important: this reorientation does not entail a supplement at the origin, but only as byproduct of the event. If I had time, I would exegete the creation narrative from Tolkien's Silmarillion as an example. But yes, under fallen creation, there are different necessary principles of existence--e.g., death is primary, life secondary. This the basic narrative I am after: Life; Death (-in-life); Life (-in-Death)....

Regarding election--I did mention a certain kind of election. The one Williams presents and the one that influences a great number of (poorly informed) Reformed Christians I have met. I also mentioned that accepted that particular view of election was rather "iffy."

Necessity of existence--Because the original necessity of existence (after the Fall) is no longer sufficient. The original creational necessity of existence IS affirmed in Christ, and we know (of) it primarily from the apocalyptic (or, eschatological; or, Christological--they are all really the same) perspective, not from the original. But the original order is no longer sufficient, because it has been overshadowed by anathema.

The antagonism, in other words, is not dualistic. It is not either creation or redemption. It is either FALLEN creation or redemption. Redemption is precisely the redeeming (not the simple resuscitation, though) of original creation and, as you put it, its original blessing. My point is not that original creation is worthless, but that it is no longer operative.

My words should be taken more precisely at that point. While salvation may work in two directions (though, do you mean temporally or poetically [poiesis]?), with regard to original creation we must speak of redemption. The grace that offers life abundantly which we now (must!) receive from God, does not reach us from creation, but from the cross. Even so, I allow for the trace of grace in the created order with two qualifiers, "primarily" and "in the main."

Probably your most important question, however, is this: "How does the original blessing of God that continues to gift and call creation to (more) life usurp any legitimacy from Christ's act?" I am not sure the original blessing of God does continue to gift and call creation. The original blessing was on original creation. Perhaps where we differ is my tendency (I will have to think more about this) to see the post-lapsarian malediction of God as overriding the original blessing. Even so, if it is still operative, it does not usurp any legitimacy from Christ's act, but can only be truly rediscovered through Christ's act. This is really not far from there being no (post-lapsarian) "natural" knowledge of God. Scotus would not like me much.

Anyway, sorry my comments are a bit scattered and sprawling. Your questions are forcing me to articulate my position more thoroughly than I have yet needed. I am glad for the opportunity, but also feel compelled to provide a timely answer. I hope it is worthy of the conversation.

Thanks again. As always, if I have said something astray, feel free to pursue it with further challenges. This is how we learn.

Peace,
Andy

Andy said...

Alright, I read over my response and should fill in a couple of gaps.

I wrote "Election--..." Not much of an answer there, so feel free to push me further. I do come around to the kind of election presented at the end of the original post, in the quote by Williams. But clearly I don't go into too much detail in the post.

Also, I wrote "Necessity of existence--...." and apparently expected you to know exactly to what I was referring. I am referring there to your second question: "why does a creational necessity of/for existence necessitate an antagonism against Christ's act?" I tease out the elements. That there is any antagonism at all is due to the insufficiency, after the fall, of the original. Then I try to explain that the antagonism is not a simple opposition.

Sorry to have given you such short shrift there.

Also, I barely touched on co-inherence. The reason that paragraph on the natural and supernatural coinherence made me stop and think was that it is the functional element in the ontology I'm working with. Just as all have died in Adam, we will be raised with the second Adam. Without a kind of ontological co-inherence with Adam, we are not under the curse; there is no original sin. Hence, the co-inherence is natural, that is, a necessary principle of our existence. And this necessity has not changed in the Fall, but is rather born in the Fall (since the Parents had no descendents before the Fall). At any rate, our co-inherence with the second Adam, by baptism and Eucharist primarily, the sacraments of the Spirit, releases us from the co-inherence with Adam. We find ourselves still caught in the domain of death, even though our promise is life. And so we recognize that not only our baptism, but also our own death is a sacrament of our co-inherence with Christ. I digress too much. I hope these last thoughts are helpful.

I must adjourn.

Best,
Andy

Larry said...

Andy,

Greetings. Many thanks for your (two) response(s) to my questions and every increasing revelation of the drama.

I want to start with your second response and work back to your first. You wrote: "Just as all have died in Adam, we will be raised with the second Adam. Without a kind of ontological co-inherence with Adam, we are not under the curse; there is no original sin. Hence, the co-inherence is natural, that is, a necessary principle of our existence. And this necessity has not changed in the Fall, but is rather born in the Fall (since the Parents had no descendents before the Fall)." If co-inherence is ontological and given with the "Adam" then I wonder why you do not first describe its original quality--its gifting quality? I think that you leave some ambiguity in your description by suggesting that it is natural and "born in the Fall". It seems that the Fall perverts the naturalness of co-inherence, perhaps aborting it not birthing it. I think that thinking through the original giftedness of co-inherence (could this be intersubjectivity?) that you could abandon the bio-speculative remark on Adam (which consequencially ignores the role of Eve). Don't Eve's eggs exist before the Fall? All things considered I like the idea of co-inherence and find it to be a fecund description of relatedness; I just might want to broaded its applicability.

To your first comments: I cannot help but agree the Williams was a lovely figure who was some what abused in my first response. That said, I found your response to the question of "re-orient" or "adjust" to be exciting. You wrote: "I never said the Fall left everything original. In fact, it is part of my position that the necessary principles of existence (ontology) undergo events, i.e. they CHANGE". I think this is perhaps an incredible site of intersection that we both are struggling to articulate. I understand part of the original goodness of creation to be the fact that it changes. Dooyeweerd attempts to articulate this in his theory of positivization but gets stuck with Augustine on the idea of creation as garden with seeds that need time to mature; furthermore, his theory seems to fail to answer to the aporia of structure and genesis. So I could see why you would appeal to CHANGE in you position on a redemptive drama--an unfolding of history towards the eschaton. A creational ontology that posits an unchangable law is unacceptable after modern/postmodern theologies turn to the Fathers. I want to hold out my white flag here and ask for more on this subject. Perhaps a more productive response to your reply would be an attempt to construct answers that admit this given change in creation?

When I pressed you on the relationship between "co-inherence" and "original creation" you suggest that this was in no way a supplement but "a byproduct of the event". The event of the Fall opens up another production along side or parasitc to creation's original blessing? I would suggest that this tension between the nature of the "byproduct" is the difficulty of determining the nature of the kingdom of darkness: it holds to a quasi-original claim while asserting its sovereignty on in negation to goodness. Is this ambiguity cruelly rooted in the givenness of creation to change? Is creation's openness to cultivation its openness to evil? OR, is evil the "nothing" that results from closing down creation's opening to its future, i.e., shuting down the eschaton deprives creation from its original blessing? These question will keep me up tonight.

Another point I parse is your understanding of redemption that I have argued is a conflation of redemption and eschatology. You write, "Redemption is precisely the redeeming (not the simple resuscitation, though) of original creation and, as you put it, its original blessing." Without you parenthetical remark I would have accepted this statement but I am glad that you mention "resuscitation" because it allows me to highlight my concern. It is certainly true that the "resuscitation" of life would mean life as usual (in the Fall). If you save a person from harsh waters and breath life back into them you haven't saved them from death, just death from those waters. The threat of those waters remain since you haven't redeemed the situation that caused the threat of death in the first place. In this way, creation cannot redeem itself since it has turned into a threat of harsh waters. But are these waters acting harshing on their own accord or are they not tortured by strife of the Fall and thus being acted upon by evil? I ask this because it seems that you view creation as acting harshly in stead of re-acting to/in the harshness of the Fall. I wonder if it is easier to imagine a certain agency for Creation if we seperated its reaction to the Fall from its primordial act of gifted-genesis? Holding to this possibility for thinking through the relationship between Creation-Fall-Redemption would suggest that breathing new life into creation is never merely resuscitation but always offering a possibility for new life to come. You cannot offer life in creation without opening that life up to the possibility of newness; creation is, in every breath, hopeful; it is nevery either Fallen creation or Redemption but Creation-Fall-Remption-Eschaton.

Finally, the latent anthropocentrism in the drama. Perhaps thinking through the role/agency of creation is an important way to keep us from theologies that assert too much anthropomorphism or too much theocentrism? My concern comes from this statement: "When I say sin does not go so deep as to defile the imago, but deep enough to re-orient the necessary principles of existence, we should keep in mind that the creation was not created in the image and likeness, humanity was. That is, the only thing untouched by the Fall, is the image and likeness; the rest falls under the curse." The only thing that is not sacrificed in the Fall is the Imago Dei, "the rest falls under the curse". You maintain this position by insisting on a distinction between Creation and the (creation of) Imago Dei. I must admit that I do not think that the text affirms this position--if anything the texts suggest that the earth creature images God primarily in tending to creation; by cultivating creation the imago dei cultivates the image of God. I also don't think sustaining the Imago Dei against all odds, since chances are that the reasons for sustaining the Imago Dei will fall with "all the rest" of creation due to the primordial creatureliness of the Imago Dei. This said, I too want to hold to someting unsacrificable to the Fall or curse, but, I think that this residue or trace must be more ubiquitious than humanity and less uniform than a single species (although I do think it could function metonymically and thus affirm the status of the Imago Dei). Why would the possibility for imaging God remain untouched in the Fall? unless it was something more, perhaps the iconic possibility of all of creation to show the glory of God!
Many Blessings,
Larry

Andy said...

Larry,

As always, thanks for thinking with me on these matters.

Co-inherence. The ambiguity you tease out in your first question/response is one of those things I wish I had the time to expand on. I'll do so briefly. The reason I balked at the original giftedness of the co-inherence was a speculative leap that I was not really prepared to consider just yet. The problem is, no offspring were begotten before the Fall. We might assume that this is irrelevant, but for the fact that the original Parents would have known both Eden and Expulsion, whereas we only know the Expulsion. The anthropomorphic narrative also makes things difficult here. In so saying, have I bound myself to Adam and Eve as literal parents? Probably not, but I suppose my remarks could be so read. At any rate, it is the epistemological/existential problem that I am confronting--namely, none of us has known Eden. Does this somehow prohibit a kind of full co-inherence? Can we only claim the original blessing aspect of the co-inherence if we have known Eden? These are the questions that at the time necessitated my circumlocution. This tempts me to stray back towards my previous remarks about the origin being known through the eschaton, that is, through Christ. In the recapitulation, we discover the reality of the origin, though in the eschaton that origin is always-already fulfilled and supplemented. And so, it is no wonder that the origin seems fuzzy (two original biological parents or metaphoric parents), since the original blessing is known most fully retrospectively through Christ.

As for change in creation. On this I am more or less ignorant. What I mean is, I have no idea how original creation worked, and this again is because I have not yet really grasped the theological significance of time. There is a part of me that wants to argue that the Fall entailed also a fall to time. But there is another part of me that wishes only to argue that we fell to diachronic time. There are several other little me's arguing all kinds of silly things in between. What I really want to stress is that ontology fundamentally shifted--not to say metamorphized or completely restructured in a radical sense (apples did not become oranges) but it all shifted--from the domain of life to the dominion of death. This is the change. The event of the Fall is the change in ontology I was after. But your question on change in original creation is interesting. If you have thoughts, I'd like to hear them.

The questions that kept you up are wonderful questions. Really top-notch. As much as I appreciate the perspective that evil is the privation of the good, I do like your suggestion that it is parasitic on the good. In this sense, then, evil has some sort of agency, and if agency then perhaps evil is not a simple lack. But then, I also like your second alternative. I wonder if the answer might be that evil is really both. That is, the Fall closed off the eschaton (death) AND in the life that lingered, it cultivated itself. Now the question here would be, then what is the source not only of the lingering life, but also of the good found among humans? Is this retained from Eden or is it gifted to the Fallen world through revelation? I lean toward the latter; I suspect you lean toward the former.

You are right to emphasize the life-giving/sustaining structure of creation. This is indeed what we consider its origin, its original intention perhaps. But the curse of the Fall is that the very creation which was supposed to support life, now also promotes, and succumbs to, death. I need to be more precise here. While I would affirm the life-giving design of Creation, can anyone deny the death-dealing fact of "nature"? The wilderness is not safe; the desert is wild. Outside the city there is only a strange half-life (according to many ancients); outside the church there is no salvation (according to another ancient). Civilization is salvation to those who perish in the wild. The Kingdom of God is salvation to those who perish. In other words, what happened? I'm not sure there is a greater ontological shift from life to death or death to life. In fact, is that not THE FUNDAMENTAL ontological shift to which any claimant to an alteration of ontology must anchor. While all of creation did not go from life to death (or else there would be nothing), both life and death commingled in the Fall in that everything now tends toward death, whereas (we postulate) in the origin everything tended toward life. (In saying this, I may very well be affirming that change was part of original creation, for how can anything "tend" if there is no time and no change?)

My response to your concern regarding the anthropomorphism in the drama on which I'm trying to elaborate has to do with the function of humanity. In other words, I am inclined to take a hard line on the stewardship of Adam (and his kin). What is more, I feel like Adam Steward is somehow linked to the imago. Whereas you emphasize creation/creating as the distinctive mark of the imago, I think I would emphasize stewardship of the creation as the mark of the imago. This is a position of which we humans are never free, regardless of our irresponsibility, until the eschaton is fulfilled. Creation is something we can not-do. That is, we can simply not create. But we are stewards whether we behave like them or not. With creation, action, activity is required; with stewardship, even inactivity is action. Although we are given the power to (sub-)create, our responsibility is not creation, but managing, tending, cultivating creation. And I think the text supports exactly this. God does not ask Adam to create animals; God asks Adam to name them, to order them, to manage the creation God had made in God's joy.

Creation (apart from humanity) is not sacrificable, but the stewards sacrifice it daily--and creation also deals harshly with them. The reason I locate the imago in humanity is not simply because the Bible told me so ("Let us make MAN [Adam in the Hebrew, anthropos in the LXX, homo in Vulgate] in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion...." "So God created MAN in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them."). I also locate the imago in humanity because humanity is, clearly, a species apart. There is a certain excess of life that makes humans different from animals, vegetation, insects. By removing the imago from the crucible of the curse I do not imply that all of creation is now expendable, any more than the rest of humanity (apart from the imago) is expendable. It is just that everything else is subject to decay and oblivion. The imago remains.

I'm afraid I don't find that answer complete, but it is the best I can muster just now.

I think a more important question is suggested by your last line: the iconic possibility of all of creation to show the glory of God. What I need to be able to account for in my treatment of creation is the beauty that shines through creation. Those non-Christians who have perceived in creation something of God are the ultimate test to my work in this area. That is, is there indeed a natural knowledge of God embedded in creation? With Barth's (in)famous exclamation, I am tempted to blurt out, "Nein!" I am tempted rather to see that vision of creation as a grace given through the imago to the steward. But it is, I think an intuition fulfilled in the Christian aesthetic. As Father Zosima says in Dostoyevsky's Brothers Karamozov,

"Love all of God's creation, both the whole of it and every grain of sand. Love every leaf, every ray of God's light. Love animals, love plants, love each thing. If you love each thing, you will perceive the mystery of God in things. Once you have perceived it, you will begin tirelessly to perceive more and more of it every day. And you will come at last to love the whole world with an entire, universal love."

The whole passage (from VI.3.g)is perhaps the most brilliant piece of exhortation I have ever read. It is a section on prayer. That particular quote actually begins with, "Brothers, do not be afraid of men's sin, love man also in his sin, for this likeness of God's love is the height of love on earth." The love of Christ is already embedded into this love for the whole creation. The emphasis in the passage was mine, because stresses that only love can perceive the original correctly, but as I just pointed out, that love is already a love which belongs to our co-inherence with Christ. And this again brings us full circle--only from the apocalypse of Jesus Christ can our perception be true to the original, but already then supplemented by the pleroma, the utter plenitude, of the Kingdom of God.

As always, send me more if/when you have it.

Grace and Peace,
Andy

Larry said...

Andy,

I cannot help but jump on further speculation. I love the thoughts on our first parents for this simple reason, the fact that the Eve carried the future in her ovaries is enough to suggest that Creation is still given in spite of the expulsion. Although I completely agree with you that the city offers us life--who would want to live without its many conviences (that might also be killing us): "Outside the city there is only a strange half-life (according to many ancients); outside the church there is no salvation (according to another ancient)". I also think that maybe the early desert fathers' were witnessing to another possibility than this culture verse nature split.

As to your comments on stewardship and creation/creativity, I think that creativity is more basic than stewardship and that, currently, stewardship is a moralist term that is often employed without creativity. This snide remark aside, I also want to add that you're right, "we can simply not create". I also think that there might be some truth to the moralization of stewardship since you are able to think of non-acting as creation (de-creation, as I would put it). The big difference is that I would not ever want to say that I manage creation...rather, I would suggest that we co-create with creation, dual-dynamais of sorts(?). Ontologically this has shown up in the problem of language and the relationship between a name and a being.

Next, I want to approach you attempt to hold onto a special place for humanity: "There is a certain excess of life that makes humans different from animals, vegetation, insects." I can accept the fact that humanity makes signs and cultivates as something different but I am unable to locate the ultimate difference, that would seperate us from them; (politically(?)) the animals. I think that a creational ontology does not shy away from the communion of humanity and animality; and actually is enlivened by it. I cannot see how the imago dei is not an animal. So when you write, "It is just that everything else is subject to decay and oblivion," I wonder, hasn't this been the case of humanity since 1900?

Your work on Dostoyevsky is an accomplishment indeed and leads you to write: "The love of Christ is already embedded into this love for the whole creation. The emphasis in the passage was mine, because stresses that only love can perceive the original correctly...[no buts about it]"

Love is so original, isn't it.

Many Thanks,
Larry

Anonymous said...

Hi, Im from Melbourne.
I find all of that to be an incomprehensible lot of psycho-babble---a tower of babble (babel.

At best a work of imaginative fiction with no basis in the Reality of the Divine-human condition, now, now and now.

By contrast please check out this Illuminated Understanding of Saint Jesus of Galilee.

1. www.dabase.org/spiritw.htm
2. www.dabase.org/exochrist.htm

Plus references on Real God.

1. www.dabase.org/dht7.htm
2. www.dabase.org/broken.htm
3. www.dabase.org/tfrbklih.htm
4. www.realgod.org

Andy said...

Dear Anonymous from Melbourne,

Your initial comment is very rude. Just because you do not understand the conversation does not mean it is unimportant. Not to mention, psycho-babble refers to jargon of the psychological or psychiatric philosophies and sciences, which I have not employed.

I have looked at a couple of the sites you listed, and you are deluding yourself. This Real God movement is one particular instance of New Age spiritual buffet-style sentimentality. You are denying the very thing you are practicing. If you wish to be rid of New Age, piecemeal "do-it-yourself" spirituality, be obedient (faithful) to one tradition. Regarding Jesus, you need to learn more about the origins of Christianity. There is not a such a radical break between Jesus and Christianity as you suppose.

I do not have the time to explain why the Real God project is self-defeating because it should be self-evident. The commitments evinced on the website belie commitments both to monotheism and Indian spiritual pluralism. This is already, for instance, piecemeal "do-it-yourself" spirituality under the guise of "empirical" (read: scientific) research.

I hope you reconsider your alignment and maybe learn more about actual religions from reputable sources before you decide they are not worth your time. And I certainly hope in the future you will refrain from castigating someone on their own forum simply because they are discussing matters about which you are not well-educated, nor apparently willing to learn more about.

Best,
Andy